Language Of Race Essay

(Review of Lawrence Blum, Im non a Racist, But The lesson Quandary of Race (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 2002). conjecture and Research in Education 1(3), pp. 267-281. ) Lawrence Blums book, Im non a Racist, But The Moral Quandary of Race, is excellent and thought-provoking. It is a model of incorrupt philosophy be be well, and, as importantly, d 1ness with a purpose. At no point does iodine wonder, as superstar does with all(prenominal) too much honourable philosophy these days, Why does this matter? Blum makes it iron out from the start why we should care somewhat the language and designs of flow and racism, and he does a brilliant job of integrating careful philosophical analysis with contemporary examples, diachronic explication, and creative thought experiments. Blums purpose is basically two-fold first, to fight against racism and racial in arbitrator by proving that the notion of endure is both(prenominal) descriptively false and deterrent examplely ini mical and replacing it with the more straight and mathematical meshful notion of racialized convention and import, to enable and promote productive dialogue ab break racism and racial inequality, curiously between members of different racialized groups.He is explicit only about the second of these rents as he comments in the preface and reiterates in similar terms passim the book, If we agree that racism is so important, dont we need to know what it is? How fecal matter we talk intelligently, especially across racial lines, unless we do? (p. viii) plainly the first beat clearly determines the structure and nitty-gritty especially of the second half of the book. In both cases, Blum suggests that language is a key we discharge both move forward in the fight against racial injustice and promote cross-racial dialogue about racism and some differently racial ills, he suggests, if we analyze and clear upwhat we mean by certain words that are often used too loosely (su ch(prenominal)(prenominal) as racialist and racial 2 dissimilitude) recapture other terms that look up inappropriately been divested of moral weight (such as racial insensitivity and loss) and abandon the language of line of achievement alto stringher because its narrative of use has made it intactly misleading. This is the primary thrust of the book. In this essay, I go out question Blums emphasis on language and appointment.I will suggest that disagreements about the racial language we use, such as about what racism is, are integral elements of the postulate about hunt and racial injustice, quite than something that stern and should be resolved ahead of time. Although Blum restricts his analysis of racial language as creation except clarificatory, thitherfore, and knowing to advance cross-racial dialogue from the outside, as it were, I will argue that instead he is doing something out-of-the-way(prenominal) different. At best, he is staking a partisan position with in the debate itself at worst, he is bare it off from the start by building the answers to most of the important questions about racism and racial unlikeness into hisdefinitions. In addition to these methodological concerns, I also will query the practical results of implementing the linguistic shifts Blum proposes. I will argue, first, that implementation of racialized group-talk will be harder than Blum suggests ( fifty-fifty among state who fully accept his arguments and are automatic and even eager to abandon public life in favor of racialized group), and second, that it is un promising to have the affable mental effects Blum predicts.In both of these cases, I will consider t from each oneers lend oneselfs in implementing anti- anti-Semite(a) curricula as an important test case, since teachers (a yearn with parents and the media) play a crucial role in shaping the racial language and attitudes of the following generation. i Before I tackle these issues, however, a brie f summary of (and a couple of quibbles with) Im Not a Racist, But are in order. 3 Blum establishes the moral and conceptual introduction for his project in his first and longest chapter, Racism Its Core Meaning. In this chapter, Blum provides a deft historical, moral, and conceptual analysis of racist and racism. He is concerned to construct a definition that preserves the strong moral opprobrium that attaches to racism while avoiding the conceptual inflation, moral everyplaceload, and categorical drift that have come to characterize the terms racism and racist i. e. , the indiscriminate action of these terms to a wide variety of categories (such as motives, beliefs, acts, and people) encompassing any and all racial ills from bigotry to prejudice to racial discomfort, as well as even to non-racial ills such as discrepancy based on age, religion, nationality, or physical searchance.By contrast, Blum limits the application of racism to things stemming specifically from distast e and/or an inferiorizing attitude toward a racial group. He shows why antipathy and inferiorizing are both sufficient and requisite to his definition for example, one may feel benevolent toward blacks in part because one feels superior to them, unless feel antipathetic toward Asians because one assumes they are smarter than oneself both attitudes would be properly classified as racist, and he argues persuasively that all other examples of racism could fit into one or both of these broad categories.Hence, Blum shows, although racism apprize be attrisolelyed to motives, acts, people, symbols, beliefs, images, epithets, remarks, attitudes, individuals, societies, and institutions (all categories that Blum discusses in detail), each attri saveion mustiness be independently justified one cannot just assume that a person who displays a racist symbol, for example, is a racist herself, or even that she necessarily has racist motives.In this respect, Blum is sensitive to the mitigati ng (although still chastely suspect) issues of individual ignorance, unreflective adoption of brotherly norms and behaviors, and unconscious attitudes, any of which may cause an individual to appear tho not to be racist, or alternatively to be racist in fact, only when to have adopted these racist attitudes 4 subconsciously or even unconsciously.ii Finally, in this chapter Blum gives of import oversight not just to racisms definition but also to its particular moral character. He argues that racism is morally evil not just because it violates usual moral norms such as equality, respect, and advanced will, but also because of its integral tie to historical lean-based systems of oppression that were clearly evil. Racism draws its moral valence from this historical context in two ways. First, the mere fact that these historical systems were based on race provides some of that opprobrium, even if current instances of racism no longer take place in the subscribe context of, fo r example, segregation, apartheid, or slavery. . . . Second . . . we continue to live with the legacy of those systems (Blum 2002 27-8). In chapter 2, Blum asks Can Blacks Be Racist? and answers in the affirmative.No matter what preconditions one places on racism (e. g. that it must be ideologically embedded, or have with neighborly power), Blum argues, there will be (and are) some black people (as well as members of other minority groups) who meet these criteria and hence must be judged to be racist.Insofar as the denial that blacks can be racist is motivated by a desire to steeplight the inherent inequalities among different racist acts and beliefs, however, Blum would agree and argues that there are important moral asymmetries in racism. Because of such acts historical resonance (p. 44), great power to shame due to minorities positional inferiority (p.46), reflection of on-going patterns and prevalence of racism (p. 48), and contribution to maintaining overbearing racial injustice (p. 49), Everything else being equal, greater moral opprobrium rightly attaches to racism by lights against people of color than the reverse. This is the most important moral asymmetry in racism (pp. 43-4).Chapter 3 catalogues Varieties of Racial Ills, which are acts or attitudes that deserve some (often substantial) degree of moral condemnation but do not nobble to the level of racism as 5 such.These include racial insensitivity, racial ignorance, racial discomfort, white privilege,exclusionary same-race socializing, and racialism (a term used here to mean conferring too much, or inappropriate, importance on peoples racial identity (p. 59), but which Blum confusingly reuses with a different meaning in chapters 5-9). Chapter 4 then moves into an extremely careful and thoughtful discussion of Racial Discrimination and Color Blindness. He deduces four reasons that discrimination may be wrong (1) it unfairly excludes a qualified individual on the basis of a characteristi c irrelevant to the task for which selection is being made(2) it is done out of prejudice (3) the prejudice is pervasive and (for that or other reasons) stigmatizing (4) the discrimination helps to sustain the group whose members are discriminated against in a ally position (p. 89). Hence, he argues, the term racial discrimination, which automatically carries with it the implication of moral condemnation, should be confined to forms of discrimination involving race that either stem from race-based prejudiced sic or that disadvantage an inferiorized or stigmatized group (p. 95).In contrast, he argues, forms of racial differentiation that avoid the four pitfalls listed above may be tolerated or even embraced for example, racial egalitarianism, which does rely to some extent on racial differentiation but not on discrimination as defined above, is preferable to color blindness. Chapters 5-7 form an undesignated second section of Im Not a Racist, But, focusing specifically on the concep t, history, and science of race in order to break it. Blum analyzes the empirical outcomes of thinking in racial terms in chapter 5, Race What We Mean and What We Think We Mean. He identifies four moral dangers of racial thinking (1) a moral distance among those of different races an intensified ken of a we of one race counterposed to a they of another (p. 102) (2) the imposition of false commonality on all those classified as members of the same race (p. 103) (3) the suggestion of an inescapable 6 racial fate (p. 104) and (4) associations of transcendency and inferiority of value (p. 104). These lead into chapter 6s fascinating discussion of Race A skeleton History, with Moral Implications, in which Blum shows the historical contingency and relatively recent vintage of racial thinking, at to the lowest degree(prenominal) in the West.(Although Blums language about races recent arrival on the shooting is fairly global, his examples are almost entirely confined to ancient Gree ce and Rome, Europe, and North America this leaves the reader a bit confused about the intended scope of his historical analysis and claims. ) Finally, chapter 7 boldly asks, Do Races Exist? and marshals a fair amount of scientific evince (in conjunction with the historical evidence from chapter 6) to answer a resounding no. This outright precludeion of race sets up the challenge he confronts in the final two chapters (and un stated third section) of the book how simultaneously to rid ourselves of the inimical concept of race while still promoting the causes of racial justice and equality causes which, as Blum showed in chapter 4, rent for their achievement that we name and pay attention (as opposed to blind ourselves) to differences among racial groups. iii In chapter 8, Racialized Groups and Social Constructions, therefore, Blum proposes to replace the concept of races with racialized groups, arguing, The term racialized groups is preferable as a way ofacknowledging that some groups have been created by being do by as if they were races, while also acknowledging that race in its popular meaning is entirely false (p. 160). Blum get on justifies use of the term racialized groups in chapter 9, Should We Try to Give Up Race? He argues that racial justice and even a positive sense of racial identity can be promoted by racialization its recognition supplies a more consummate understanding of the character of the racialized social order, advertizes a stronger recognition of commonalities of experience and of semipolitical and moral commitments across racial lines, and, arguably, would in the long run be 7 more politically effective in mitigating racism and racial injustice than would a belief in the reality of race (p. 170).But Blum recognizes that merely transforming our language is not enough this act will not itself transform the raw social structures that inform and shape our language In the real world, ridding ourselves of the myth of race can not be severed from the politically more challenging task of changing the structural relationships among racial groups (p. 178).Hence, he concludes by implicitly urging a two-pronged feeler to promoting racial justice and equality altering our language, on the one hand, and engaging in direct social action (especially integrationism), on the other. Critique I dislodge most of Blums arguments compelling taken on an individual basis. Im Not a Racist, But convinces me that the term racism should be reserved for race-related, morally egregious beliefs/motives/acts/etc. , that theres a wide range of racial ills, that pursuit of racial equality does not amount to racial discrimination, that race is a morally inimical concept, and that racialized group better captures the historical genesis and conceptual structure we call race. I am not convinced, however, that these arguments taken together satisfy the central articulated aim of the book namely, to promote cross-racial dialogue about rac e. This is not, as Ive said, because I question his reasoning or his conclusions rather, I question whether his method, of using substantive moral philosophy, is consonant with this aim.First, some reminders about Blums stated aim. As I noted at the beginning of this essay, Blum asks in the preface of Im Not a Racist, But, If we agree that racism is so important, dont we need to know what it is? How can we talk intelligently, especially across racial lines, unless we do? . . . . We need to clarify what racism is, to find a basis in history and current use 8 for fixing a definition (p. viii). He reiterates this concern at the beginning of chapter 2 My goal of an adequate account of racism is entirely antithetical to race-based attachment to definitions of racism. I am seeking an account that will facilitate communication between groups about the character, forms and extent of racism (and other race-related ills).For that we need some agreement on what racism is, and from there we ca n attempt to settle differences about its extent (p. 35). Blums aim is clearly to establish a service line for discussion to foster productive communication by providing moral and conceptual clarification and then to get out of the way in order to allow the now intelligent and facilitated debate to proceed on its own. This is an admirable goal, but I dont think that Im Not a Racist, But achieves it nor do I think that it could achieve it in its current form.This is so for a fewer reasons. First, it is misleading to suggest that moral philosophy is necessary to fix a definition of racism. So long as theres an agreement, or at least mutual comprehension among the interlocutors, as to what each person means in using various terms, then that is sufficient to promote dialogue. For example, if all people accepted that only whites could be racist, then cross-racial dialogue could proceed on that basis theres no reason that Blums definition of racism (which asserts that all people can b e racist) is necessary to promote dialogue.Of course, one of Blums implicit points is that there isnt agreement about what racism is, and that such agreement, or even mutual clarification and comprehension, is very unlikely to arise on its own. Rather than divine revelation a troubling weakness or gap in the discussion, however, this reveal instead the essential temperament of the debate about race and racism namely, that debating the meaning of these terms is part and parcel of debating the things themselves. In other words, fixing a definition is not a inert act. It is a partisan act.This is because much of the feud about racism is bound up in how one defines the problem. If individuals unintentionally benefit 9 from the legacy of racism (e. g.via white privilege), are they morally responsible in some way? Is it racially discriminatory for an association serving mostly Hispanic youth to try to hire mostly Latino staff? Is it racist for a small business owner to hire people she feels comfortable with, if it turns out she tends to feel comfortable only with people from her own racialized group, since thats among whom she grew up? These questions lie at the affection of the conversation about race they cannot and should not be settled ahead of time. Thus, Blums second methodological mistake is to think that setting a neutral baseline for discussion is even possible.Blums approach is inevitably partisan simply in trying to clarify meanings, he takes stances on a act of controversial issues and hence he is within rather than above the fray. This is perfectly appropriate taking and reason particular stances about how we ought to live our lives is what moral philosophy is, or at least should be, about but it is not what Blum professes to be doing. Furthermore, Blums approach is at least partly opposed to his stated aim of promoting cross-racial dialogue about race and racism, insofar as to the extent that readers accept Blums positions as attached, their avenues for debate about race and racism will be cut off rather than expanded.I commit (and expect) instead that readers will be drawn to engage with and debate the arguments themselves, as any good stool of social and moral philosophy should inspire people to do they do not, however, provide a neutral starting point for others conversations. iv My concerns about the match between Blums stated objective and the content of his book are irrelevant to my assessment of his arguments or his conclusions, most of which I think are broadly speaking on target.I do wonder, however, about the concrete, on the ground implications of his conclusions, especially but not altogether for those responsible for educating the next generation. I will address two especially pressing questions (1) How would one use the 10 language of racialized groups in a way that was clearly distinct from using the language of race, especially in institutional contexts? (2) Is there convincing psychological evidence to support Blums claims about the results of redescribing social and identity groups?For example, is there convincing evidence that thinking of oneself as being a member of a socially constructed racialized group has more positive psychological effects than thinking of oneself as a member of a biologically-determined race?These questions rebuke issues that are significant for assessing the practical import of Blums arguments in general they are also crucial for determining how his conclusions would alter anti-racist curricula and pedagogy in the classroom, which presumably will be central to the realization of Blums moral philosophy. First, Blums claim that we can combat racism (at least to some extent) by altering our language about race has moral purchase only if there is some way to operationalize and especially to institutionalize this linguistic adjustment.Blum seems to acknowledge this, and to be optimistic about its voltage Appreciating the difference between race and ra cialization, and at the same time attempting to do justice to the unreality of race and the reality of racism, may point us toward new ways of thinking and new forms of institutional expend (p. 166). He gives one (and only one) example of how one might adopt new forms of institutional practice in relation to the Census, which is a key tool for tracking racial patterns and disparities in society but also hence for seeming to legitimate racial categorization.In response to this dilemma, Blum suggests, Were the federal government to encourage a broad understanding that the purposes for which the Census is now explicitly used do not require a commitment to the existence of races in any form, but only to racialized groups, the legitimate discrimination- monitoring function of Census racial categories could be severed from any implication of racialism (p. 167). But then frustratingly, Blum gives no specifics about how the Census could 11 do this. Would Blum hope for a statement of disav owal of race? If so, where? bonnie in the preamble (which already includes a baby step in that direction (see p. 227, fn. 11)), which nobody reads? Or in the census itself, which seems impractical since it is intentionally kept as short as possible in order to maximize response rates? Instead of a statement of disavowal, the Census could replace What is this persons race? (the question before long asked) with What is this persons racialized group? , and then use credit rating marks (or scare quotes) around terms such as black, Spanish/Latino/Hispanic (which is currently kept separate from the race question), and white to reinforce their constructed status.This is also unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons. First, racialized group will likely be either greeted with confusion or treated as a synonym of race, especially in the absence of an explanation of the term in the latter case, it is likely to end up acquiring the separatist, hierarchical, and essentialist connotations or r ace (just like disabled and even differently abled acquired those of the maligned term handicapped they were designed to replace).Second, many of the choices given are not (yet) racialized groups, at least not in the United States, but are nationalities Samoan, Filipino, inborn Hawaiian, Asian Indian, Japanese. Should these terms all be in scare quotes? I would think not but then how would one deal with the presence of scare quotes some places and their absence others? One could add nationality and/or ethnicity to the racialized group question, and then surround everything with quotation marks but this then gets cumbersome, to say the least, and is likely to raise other dilemmas. As the Census example shows, institutionalizing racialized group language is hard inprint, particularly when it comes to naming and labeling the racialized groups themselves (black, white, Vietnamese, Native American). It is substantially harder in conversation, 12 such as in the oral discussion of a cl assroom. Consider Ellen, a teacher of ten and eleven year-olds, who is eager to incorporate anti-racist education into her teaching. Ellen reads Im Not a Racist, But over the winter holiday and then sits down to rescript her January lesson plans, which include a unit on non-violent protest designed both to fit into the schools conflictresolution initiative and to lead up to the celebration of Martin Luther King, Jr. s birthday. As she reads over her plans, she quickly inserts a mini-lesson on racialized group at the beginning of the unit and converts race to racialized group throughout the unit. She adds in a two-day lesson called What is Racism? , and develops an interactive group activity for near the end of the unit designed to help students decide when its okay to refer to or take someones racialized group membership into account and when its not. Reviewing her social studies lessons onGhandi, Martin Luther King, Jr. , and the March on Washington, D. C. , she is pleased. She al so thinks her face lesson on an excerpt of Kings Letter from Birmingham Jail will prove challenging but inspiring to her students. But then Ellen suddenly gets worried. Throughout her lessons are references to blacks, whites, Indians, British, Hindus, Christians, Jews. Which of these are racialized groups and which are not? How can she help her students figure out the difference? How can she talk about blacks and whites to her class without her students falling gumption into racial thinking?She can hand-signal scare quotes each time, but will that just turn into a joke among the students? And which groups would she use the hand signals for? All of these concerns are predicated on the conclusion that language matters that it influences how we think, reason, behave, and interact with one another. This brings us to my second question about implications of Blums conclusions is there social psychological evidence in favor of them?Throughout the book, Blum clearly operates on the assum ption that if people recognize the socially constructed, rather than biologically inherent, temperament of racialized groups, 13 then they will better be able to fight against the hierarchical and inegalitarian (p. 107) assumptions inherent in racial thinking. This is partly because racial identity then becomes in some way a matter of choice. Whether a group is racialized is a matter of its treatment by the larger society. Whether the group takes on a self-identity as a race is a different matter (p. 148).In recognizing their racialized treatment, rather than accept themselves defined by an persistent racial identity, individuals who are members of racialized groups can decide how to respond. Will they embrace their racialized identity, as those do who proudly join the Asian- American club, volunteer with La Raza, or wear t-shirts proclaiming Its a BLACK thing you wouldnt understand or Hot Latina Mama?Will they reject it, declaring thats not who I am and/or trying to assimilate? Or will they try to rescind it in some way, say by reclaiming the term nigger (or queer in the non-racial case of gays) and defiantly using it as a term of affection for others inside the group?By choosing the extent and nature of their racial identities, Blum seems implicitly to be arguing, individuals and groups are empowered whether they choose to appropriate, reject, or subvert the characterizations thrust upon them by racializing others, the very act of choosing liberates them from the racialist (and racist) assumptions of innate difference, inferiority, and/or stigma. Two substantial bodies of serve in social psychology, however, cast serious doubt on this claim.The first is system vindication theory the theory that psychological processes contribute to the preservation of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal and group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994 1).The second is the notion of stereotype threat the idea that in certain situations (those posing stereotype threat), members of stigmatized groups baffle about confirming a negative stereotype about their group through their performance on a task, and then, precisely because of this anxiety, end up performing worse on 14 the task than they otherwise would (and than others do) thus paradoxically performing true to negative stereotype (see Steele and Aronson 1995 Steele 1997). I will address each in turn.According to system justification theory, people implicitly support the status quo, including hierarchy differences between low- and high-status groups, even when they are members of low-status groups, and even when they reject the distinctions on a conscious level. Thus, in studies done under both authentic and experimental conditions, women ask for lower wages than men do for the same work (or they work 25 percent longer than men if offered the same wage (Cite forthcoming)) individuals rate even initially unwanted outcomes (such as tuition increases, or a member of the oppos ing political party lovely an election) more desirable the more likely they are to occur (Kay et al.2002)And they rationalize the legitimacy of existing inequalities (e. g. , if told that graduates of University B earn more on average than University A graduates, University A students will rate University B students as being smarter and better writers than they if told the opposite, however, then University A students will express the opposite prejudice and rate themselves higher(prenominal) (cite forthcoming)). Even individuals who explicitly articulate egalitarian beliefs tend to demonstrate moderate to strong implicit attitudinal biases toward higher-status groups (whites, materialization people, men) this is true regardless of the individuals own group membership(s) (Greenwald and Banaji 1995 Banaji 2001).In other words, individuals internalize prejudice, discrimination, racism, and/or oppression (Jost and Banaji 1994 Jost et al. 2002 Kay et al. 2002). Members of disadvantaged groups internalize negative stereotypes and evaluations of their own group, to at least some degree (Jost et. al. 2002 598).Thus, even if people know that they are members of a group that is treated (merely) as if there were inherent and immutable differences between them as if certain somatic characteristics marked the presence of significant characteristics of mind, emotion, and 15 character and as if some were of greater worth than others (Blum 2002 147), they are still likely to believe, subconsciously at least, that these are accurate assessments of their group membership.It takes a great deal of inner strength to stand up to stigma, discrimination, and prejudice. Even those who consciously reject racialist presumptions may respond differently subconsciously. This may be because of internalized oppression, as discussed above. But it may also be a result of rational adjustments in motivation or expectations.Knowing that one is discriminated against, stigmatized, or inherits a h istory of racial disadvantage (p. 177) may very well (and rationally) lead one to adopt a presumption of disadvantage a belief that ones effort will not be rewarded because of on-going discrimination and racism, and hence a reduction in effort, motivation, and/or aspirations. There is clear evidence of both effort reduction (Stone 2002) and aspiration reduction even among people who consciously reject stereotypes, such as women who profess a liking for mathematics (Nosek et al. 2002).This lowering of expectations is clearly compounded if individuals accept, whether implicitly or explicitly, the idea that they really are inferior in some way (as system justification theory suggests). Furthermore, as Claude Steeles acclaimed work on stereotype threat shows, there are significant psychological and performative costs even simply in knowing that one is a member of a group that is perceived in a negative light. For example, research over the past few long time has consistently shown that black students do worse on verbal tests if told the test is a measure of susceptibility than they do if they are told the test is non-diagnostic (Steele 1997) the same is true for womens performance on math tests (Keller 2002).Similarly, white students do worse than controls on tests of athletic skills if told that the their performance will indicate their natural athletic ability, but black students do worse if told their performance indicates their sports 16 intelligence (Stone, et. al. 1999).This response to stereotype threat is unmistakable even among very young children (ages six to ten) children above seven years old demonstrate high levels of stereotype consciousness ( sense of others stereotypes about various groups), and children who are members of stigmatized groups perform worse when they think they are being measured along stereotypic lines than they do on the exact same test when their stereotype awareness (and hence sense of stereotype threat) is not activated (McKo wn 2002).These results pose a serious challenge, I believe, to Blums claims about the practical import of his moral philosophy. Although it is true that this research has all been done under conditions of race rather than racialized groups being salient (insofar as racialized groups has not become a popular or widespread term), it strikes me as being highly unl.